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Foreword
I am pleased to see the Pepperdine Law Review's dedication of the
present issue to problems relating to the principle of separation of
powers. Unlike such values as freedom of speech and freedom of
religion, the principle of separation of powers does not stir the blood.
I am confident that no one has ever proclaimed "Give me separation
of powers or give me death." It is merely a mechanism for the
achievement of those other, passionately held values of liberty - and
one does not fall in love with a machine.
How important the founders of our political system thought this
principle to be, however, is attested to by Madison's exorbitant praise
in The Federalist No. 47. "No political truth," he wrote, "is certainly
of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more
enlightened patrons of liberty .... ,1 The Anti-Federalists did not
disagree. "The safety of our constitutional rights," wrote Agrippa in
the Massachusetts Gazette, "consists in having the business of govern-
ment lodged in different departments, and in having each part well
defined."2 To judge whether what was thought true in 1789 is true
today, one need only consider the state of liberty in many modern na-
tions that have admirable Bills of Rights but one-man, or one-com-
mittee, or one-party rule.
Important principles of law ought to have clear rules of application.
That is particularly true of the principle of separation of powers,
which, since it marks off the boundaries of power between three dif-
ferently constituted, and hence differently motivated, political insti-
tutions, is bound to be the regular battleground of partisan war. If
the answer to the question of what constitutes ultra vires action, or
at least the accepted methodology for determining that answer, is not
clear, neither of the two political branches can convincingly be ac-
cused before the citizenry of aggrandizing itself unlawfully, and the
Third Branch is free, at its option, to be either accomplice or oppo-
nent in the enterprise. Nothing imposes limits but the spirit of the
times, and perhaps the receptiveness to that spirit of the currently
sitting Justices. Do we fear the Imperial Presidency this year? Then
questionable congressional limitations of presidential power are all
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
2. THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST 236 (W. Allen ed. 1985).
right. Or are we in an era when, to recall the title of Woodrow Wil-
son's book emphasizing the relative impotence of American executive
power,3 we are exasperated with Congressional Government? Then
questionable presidential assumptions of power are fine. The basic
nature of our political institutions thus becomes defined (assuming
adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis) by a series of disconnected
judicial decisions whereunder various presidential and congressional
attentats are good or bad principally because they happened to be
brought before the Court during a receptive or unreceptive age.
This is, unfortunately, what seems to have happened - with the
possible exception that the assumption of adherence to stare decisis is
contrary to fact.4 Indeed, the Court's most recent decisions in the
field seem to accept in principle the proposition that each separation-
of-powers decision is to be governed by an at-large evaluation of
whether the powers assumed or taken away strengthen or enfeeble
the relevant branch too much. 5 As anyone who has wrestled with
these problems can attest, however, it is easier to deplore the current
state of affairs than to propose the obvious solution. Madison was en-
duringly correct in his assessment that "[i]t is not unfrequently a
question of real-nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of
a particular measure, will, or will not extend beyond the legislative
sphere."6 But nothing he wrote has aged as badly as his follow-up
observation that "the executive power being restrained within a nar-
rower compass, and being more simple in its nature; and the judiciary
being described by land marks, still less uncertain, projects of usurpa-
tion by either of these departments, would immediately betray and
defeat themselves."7
I have expressed my views on some separation-of-powers issues in
several recent opinions - most, regrettably (I think), dissents.8 The
views expressed in the articles printed in this issue do not reach the
same destination I do, but they must head in the same direction. By
this I mean that any attempt at analysis of this difficult field - any
effort to impose order and principle upon it instead of leaving it to be
3. See W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLI-
TICS (1885).
4. Compare, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), with Humphrey's Ex-
ecutor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935).
5. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing recent cases). See also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Young v.
United States ex reL Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987); Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714 (1986), which are cited and discussed in the Mistretta dissent.
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 334 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison, 487 U.S. at
697 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Young, 481 U.S. at 815 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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governed by transitory judicial notions of good political science - is a
step towards improvement.
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